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I. INTRODUCTION
The increasingly congested intersection of law and public policy is
fraught with unintended consequences. Perhaps nowhere is this more
true than in the education area. Recent decades provide provocative
examples. Court desegregation decisions endeavoring to increase
school integration levels-especially court decisions mandating forced
busing in many urban public school districts-paradoxically fueled
suburban migration for many families with school-age children and
departures from public to private schools.1 One result is a reduced
possibility of district-level school integration in many urban areas, es-
pecially in the North.2
School finance litigation battles have also generated unintended
consequences. For example, in California, judicial orders to equalize
per pupil spending state-wide through a more centralized school fund-
ing system led to a sought-after dilution of the historically tight nexus
between local property wealth and school and per pupil spending
levels. Consequently, California property owners can no longer safely
assume that local taxing efforts will largely benefit local schools. Not
surprisingly, property owners' willingness to tax themselves for the
benefit of public schools diminished. Although a precise causal ac-
count is both contested and complex, what is objectively clear is that
California, once among the nation's leaders in terms of its willingness
to invest in public elementary and secondary education, dropped
precipitously in the aftermath of the Serrano decision. 3 To be sure,
while Serrano is certainly not the only reason for the decline in per
pupil spending in California, it is certainly among the reasons. 4 While
the Serrano plaintiffs sought to equalize per pupil spending by raising
the spending floor, they learned that judicially-mandated equalization
could also be achieved by lowering per pupil spending ceilings. 5
1. See, e.g., DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW
176-80 (1995).
2. Id. at 174.
3. See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); William A. Fischel, How Ser-
rano Caused Proposition 13, 12 J.L. & POL. 607, 635-36 (1996).
4. For debate about the relation among the Serrano decision, Proposition 13, and
public elementary and secondary school spending in California, see, e.g., WILLIAM
A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIs: How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001); Fis-
chel, How Serrano Caused Proposition 13, supra note 3; William A. Fischel, Did
Serrano Cause Proposition 13?, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 465 (1989); William A. Fischel,
Did John Serrano Vote for Proposition 13? A Reply to Stark and Zasloffs "Tiebout
and Tax Revolts: Did Serrano Really Cause Proposition 13?," 51 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
887 (2004); Kirk Stark & Jonathan Zasloff, Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did Serrano
Really Cause Proposition 13?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 801 (2003).
5. A California lawmaker put the point aptly: "'If the schools must actually be equal
(in terms of per pupil spending),' they are saying, 'then we'll undercut them all.'"
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The No Child Left Behind Act of 20016 (NCLB), a recent and, to
many, dramatic exercise of federal authority in the K-12 education
context, 7 contributes to a tradition of unanticipated consequences. Al-
though a complete picture of the consequences-expected and unex-
pected-flowing from NCLB is far from clear, the general contours of
two unanticipated consequences-one legal and the other policy-
have emerged with sufficient clarity. Legally, school finance activists
increasingly rely on NCLB-generated evidence to support lawsuits de-
manding increased school spending. On the policy front, some states
have diluted their student performance requirements to blunt the
threat of NCLB-related sanctions. Ironically, public attention to these
unexpected results has deflected public attention away from questions
about whether NCLB has accomplished what it set out to achieve-
improve student achievement and reduce achievement gaps.8
NCLB triggered these unintended consequences and fundamen-
tally changed American education federalism. Through NCLB, the
federal government now exerts far greater policy control over the na-
tion's elementary and secondary schools. As many commentators
have already noted, NCLB relies on Congress' conditional spending
authority for its regulatory basis. 9 Thus, in exchange for developing
"rigorous" student proficiency standards (among other conditions),
states, if they so choose, become eligible to participate in NCLB and
receive federal education funding.
By seeking to hold states accountable for student performance
while allowing states to define for themselves student performance
thresholds (so long as they are rigorous), NCLB endeavors to tread
lightly on delicate and uncertain federalism terrain. Professor Jim
Ryan aptly notes that by structuring NCLB as it did, Congress sought
to straddle the "federalism fence."1o According to Ryan, the case for
direct federal education regulation of state standards could be made if
it was "determined that states cannot be trusted."" Writing in 2004,
Professor Ryan concluded that "there is not enough empirical evidence
to make a conclusion one way or the other."12 Although more evidence
JONATHAN KoZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 220
(2001).
6. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
7. See, e.g., Maria Newman, Federal Law on Failing Schools Has States Scrambling
to Comply, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2002, at B1.
8. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Visits School to Speak on Education Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 2006, at A19.
9. Kathryn A. McDermott & Laura S. Jensen, Dubious Sovereignty: Federal Condi-
tions of Aid and the No Child Left Behind Act, 80 PEABODY J. EDUC. 39 (2005).
10. James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 987 (2004).
11. Id. at 988.
12. Id. at 987.
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exists three years later, inconclusive evidence persists. Moreover,
given the variation among states, perhaps a single conclusion for the
entire country is not prudent. Nevertheless, pressure builds to revisit
the issue of permitting states to retain the ability to set their own stu-
dent performance standards.13 As a legal matter I have argued else-
where that it is reasonably clear that the federal government
possesses the requisite constitutional authority to directly regulate
student performance thresholds incident to NCLB.14 Whether this
makes for good education policy, however, is far less clear. A case
study of Nebraska's experience with its student assessment program
and NCLB illustrates some of the complexities.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part II briefly describes
NCLB's basic statutory architecture. Part III explores two unantici-
pated consequences: increased school finance litigation exposure and
states' dilution of student performance standards. Part IV assesses a
few ways in which Nebraska's experience with NCLB illustrates how
some of the necessary costs incident to our federalism structure in-
forms elementary and secondary education policy.
II. NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND THE PUSH FOR STUDENT
ACHIEVEMENT AND SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY
Critics and proponents agree that NCLB represents a significant
departure from the federal government's traditional posture regarding
policymaking for the nation's public elementary and secondary
schools.15 NCLB's vast scope contributes to this stark departure from
the status quo. NCLB implicates every public K-12 school regardless
of whether a school receives Title I funding. 16 The imposition of
school and district accountability for student academic progress drives
NCLB's vast expansion of federal engagement with local school policy.
13. See, e.g., Sam Dillon, President's Initiative to Shake Up Education is Facing Pro-
tests in Many State Capitols, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2004, at A12; Paul E. Peterson
& Martin R. West, Is Your Child's School Effective?: Don't Rely on NCLB to Tell
You, EDUC. NEXT, Fall 2006, at 76-80.
14. Michael Heise, The Political Economy of Education Federalism, 56 EMORY L.J.
125 (2006).
15. Compare James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey
Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform,
28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 183, 184 (2003) (praising NCLB partly because
it "raises the prospect of a broader redefinition of our very democracy"), with
Ryan, Perverse Incentives, supra note 10, at 944 (criticizing NCLB because it gen-
erates important unexpected consequences).
16. NCLB involves every state as all states receive some level of federal Title I fund-
ing. Not every individual school district within a state, however, receives Title I
funds. Nevertheless, various parts (but not all) of NCLB apply even to districts
that do not receive Title I funds. For a helpful summary of NCLB's key parts, see
Ryan, Perverse Incentives, supra note 10, at 942 (noting NCLB's broad statutory
reach).
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NCLB enlists the imposition of greater accountability into the service
of boosting student achievement generally, and reducing-to the point
of elimination-achievement gaps among various student
subgroups. 17
To accomplish these laudable goals, NCLB requires states to de-
velop and meet challenging academic standards,18 annually test stu-
dents to assess progress toward state standards,19 and gather and
disseminate relevant information to parents and others. 20 At the
heart of NCLB is the requirement that schools demonstrate adequate
yearly progress or face increasingly onerous sanctions. 2 1 NCLB's
broad regulatory focus differs from earlier federal statutory forays
into education policy which typically dwell on either specific types of
schools, such as those predominately serving children from low-in-
come households,22 or discrete subpopulations of students, such as
those with qualifying disabilities. 23
By upsetting the education policy status quo, NCLB invites resis-
tance. Indeed, NCLB continues to generate substantial pushback on
both the legal and political fronts. NCLB quickly triggered a number
of lawsuits challenging the Act on various grounds. 2 4 Thus far, these
17. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 § 1001, 20 U.S.C. § 6301(3)-(4) (Supp. IV 2004).
18. 20 U.S.C. § 6301(1).
19. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(G).
20. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(h).
21. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(5), (8).
22. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
23. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1990 (IDEA), Pub. L. No. 101-476,
104 Stat. 1103 (1990) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-61). In 1997,
Congress reauthorized IDEA. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No.105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. § 1400-61).
24. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Spellings, No. Civ. A. 05-CV-71535-D, 2005 WL
3149545 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 23, 2005); Complaint, Connecticut v. Spellings, No.
305-CV-1330 (D. Conn. Aug. 22, 2005) (challenging NCLB as an unconstitutional
exercise of Congressional authority), available at http://www.hartfordinfo.org/
issues/wsd/EducationFunding/complaint.pdf; Ctr. For Law and Educ. v. U.S.
Dep't. of Educ., 209 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D.D.C. 2002) (CLE I) (challenging AYP de-
terminations and testing requirements); Ctr. For Law and Educ. v. U.S. Dep't. of
Educ., 315 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D.D.C. 2004) (CLE II) (same); Reading Sch. Dist. v.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Educ., 855 A.2d 166 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) (questioning
the link between assessment and AYP determinations); Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. For
Reform Now v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 269 F. Supp. 2d 338 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (seeking enforcement of NCLB's school choice and supplemental services);
Kegerreis v. United States of America, No. 03-2232-KHV, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18012 (D. Kan. Oct. 9, 2003) (challenging NCLB as it conflicts with the IDEA);
Californians for Justice Educ. Fund v. California State Bd. Of Educ., No.
A102851, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11713 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2003) (con-
testing the state's definition of a highly qualified teacher under NCLB).
2007]
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lawsuits have not been especially effective. 25
On the political front, however, the prospects for influencing NCLB
appear more promising. That NCLB is due for reauthorization in
2007 highlights the potential for change.2 6 In addition, the recent
change in congressional control, from Republican to Democratic con-
trol, will likely increase the prospects for changing NCLB. Congres-
sional Democrats have already signaled a desire to allocate even more
federal dollars toward schools laboring under NCLB.27 Finally, even
before the recent 2006 mid-term elections, President Bush's Education
Secretary, Margaret Spellings, displayed a robust appetite for NCLB
rule waivers, despite strong public rhetoric to the contrary.
28
III. NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND'S
UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES
Whether NCLB is accomplishing its goals remains contested.29
That NCLB has generated unanticipated consequences is uncon-
tested. These unanticipated consequences influence school finance
lawsuits and state student performance standards.
A. Legal Consequence: Increased School Finance Adequacy
Litigation Exposure
The passage and implementation of NCLB helped solidify the in-
teraction between adequacy litigation and the standards and assess-
ments movement.30 Under NCLB, those states that had not already
25. For example, in School Dist. of City of Pontiac v. Spellings, a federal district court
recently granted Secretary Spellings's motion to dismiss the lawsuit. See No. Civ.
A. 05-CV-71535-D, 2005 WL 3149545, at *5. The court concluded that as a mat-
ter of law, even if NCLB required states to spend state funds to comply with
NCLB, Congress (though not an "officer or employee of the Federal Government")
possesses such authority under its conditional spending authority. Id. at *4
(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a) (Supp. II 2002)). The Connecticut lawsuit is ongo-
ing. See Robert A. Frahm, Commission Gets No-Child Earful, HARTFORD COU-
RANT, May 10, 2006, at B1. See generally Benjamin M. Superfine, Using the
Courts to Influence the Implementation of No Child Left Behind, 28 CARDozo L.
REV. 779, 782 (2006) (characterizing the litigation effort on the NCLB implemen-
tation front as ineffective).
26. David J. Hoff, Bush to Start NCLB Push in Congress, EDUC. WEEK, 2007 WLNR
736041 (Jan. 10, 2007).
27. See, e.g., Diana J. Schemo, Democrats Push for Changes to No Child Left Behind
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2007, at A14.
28. Sam Dillon, Education Law is Loosened for Failing Chicago Schools, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 2, 2005), at A12; Lois Romano & Shankar Vedantam, 'No Child'Rules to be
Eased for a Year, Schools Would Have to Show That Displaced Students Hurt
Test Scores, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2005), at A10.
29. See, e.g., Bumiller, supra note 8.
30. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 § 1001, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. IV 2004). For a
more complete discussion of NCLB and its specific statutory provisions, see An-
drew Rudalevige, No Child Left Behind: Forging a Congressional Compromise, in
[Vol. 86:119
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done so were required to establish school accountability systems that
annually assess student proficiency in math and reading. A sliding
scale of NCLB-specific consequences befalls any school that does not
achieve adequate yearly progress. Thus, a school's failure to achieve
sufficient student achievement and progress now generates liability
under federal law. The full contour of NCLB liability was not fully
appreciated, however, until school finance activists, in school finance
litigation, began to advance inadequate yearly progress under NCLB
as legal proof of inadequate education.
Changes in school finance litigation theory and doctrine help ex-
plain how NCLB informs litigation efforts. After the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez3 1 effectively closed the federal door to school finance challenges,
litigants turned to state courts and state constitutions. Litigants have
challenged school finance schemes in over forty states, and nearly
twenty state supreme courts have declared their respective school
funding programs unconstitutional. 32 Prior to 1989, those challeng-
ing school finance systems generally sought to equalize resources
among districts within a state by pursuing an equity theory.33 Since
1989, however, adequacy-based challenges have largely supplanted
equality-based claims. Modern school finance litigation contends not
that all students are entitled to the same resources, but rather that all
students should receive the funds necessary to finance an adequate
education. 3 4 Indicia of school adequacy are critical to the success of
adequacy-based lawsuits.
NCLB data and annual yearly progress (AYP) determinations di-
rectly speak to assessments of school adequacy. Specifically, NCLB
and AYP data supplement the evidentiary foundation for school fi-
nance adequacy lawsuits. At the individual student level, the more
poorly students perform on academic assessments the better it is from
a litigation standpoint. Similarly, at the school level, a determination
that a school failed to achieve AYP under NCLB greatly assists liti-
gants seeking to establish that such a school is "inadequate" in a
school finance adequacy lawsuit. That states set their own student
No CHILD LEFT BEHIND? THE POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY
23 (Paul E. Peterson & Martin West, eds., 2003).
31. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
32. For descriptions of, and citations to, the cases, see James E. Ryan, Schools, Race,
and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 266-69 & nn.70-86 (1999).
33. Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Re-
form, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 121-40 (1995); Michael Heise, State Constitutions,
School Finance Litigation, and the "Third Wave". From Equity to Adequacy, 68
TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1157-62 (1995).
34. See Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, supra note 32, at 268-69 (describing the
shift in theories and pointing out that not all cases since 1989 have shifted from
equity to adequacy claims).
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performance thresholds 3 5 make such determinations even more pow-
erful. To the extent that school finance litigants seek to transform
failure in the classroom into success in the courtroom, NCLB can pro-
vide invaluable evidentiary support.
1. Kansas
Recent adequacy litigation in Kansas illustrates how school fi-
nance adequacy litigants leveraged state standards and NCLB conse-
quences into a successful legal claim for greater resources. The
Kansas Constitution, as amended in 1966, requires the legislature to
"make suitable provision for finance of the educational interests of the
state."3 6 To fulfill its constitutional duty, in 1992, Kansas lawmakers
passed the School District Finance and Quality Performance Act
("SDFQPA").37 The SDFQPA created a statewide property tax and a
statewide system for collecting and distributing property tax reve-
nues. Although the SDFQPA begins from a presumption of equal per
pupil spending, the presumption is modified by district-specific
weighting factors. In addition, the SDFQPA established a guaranteed
state per pupil floor along with an accountability system tied to state
minimum student performance standards in specific subjects. 38 De-
spite a guaranteed per pupil spending floor, a school finance lawsuit
challenging SDFQPA succeeded in 2003.39
NCLB data played a role in the court's conclusion that SDFQPA
violated the Kansas Constitution. Specifically, part of the court's ra-
tionale for striking down the Kansas school finance system pivoted on
student academic performance. 40 In assessing whether student aca-
demic performance evidenced "adequacy" from a school finance per-
spective, the Kansas trial court assessed performance data generated
by NCLB.41
Notably, in the Kansas school finance litigation, both parties
turned to NCLB data to support their respective (and opposing) legal
positions. The plaintiffs introduced 2002 and 2003 math and reading
proficiency scores for 5th, 8th, and 11th grade students, by racial and
35. Paul E. Peterson & Frederick M. Hess, Johnny Can Read ... in Some States:
Assessing the Rigor of State Assessment Systems, EDUC. NEXT, Summer 2005, at
52-53.
36. KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
37. School District Finance and Quality Performance Act, 1992 Kansas Session Laws
§ 280, Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 72-6405-40.
38. Charles Berger, Equity Without Adjudication: Kansas School Finance Reform
and the 1992 School District and Quality Performance Act, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 28
(1998).
39. Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738, 2003 WL 22902963, at *49 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 2,
2003).
40. Id. at *45.
41. Id.
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ethnic cohort, into evidence. 4 2 The data revealed substantial achieve-
ment gaps between and among various student cohorts. The court
noted that this evidence was both "informative and disturbingly tell-
ing."4 3 The court then quickly ascribed the students' poor academic
performance to inadequate school funding.44
The defendant schools and districts also sought legal refuge from
student academic performance as defined by NCLB. Despite the glar-
ing student achievement gaps among various student sub-groups
highlighted by the plaintiffs, these gaps were not enough to preclude
the schools and districts from achieving AYP under NCLB. Achieving
AYP under NCLB, the defendants reasoned, conclusively demon-
strated that the schools and districts provided an adequate education
from a school finance perspective. 45
The court, however, dismissed the defendants' interpretation of the
student achievement data and noted that the districts could still
achieve AYP requirements even though, for the 2002 and 2003 school
years, up to 56 percent of all K-8 graders, and 48 percent of high
school students, could fail the reading standard.46 For math perform-
ance, AYP standards tolerated a 53 percent failure rate for K-8 and a
70 percent failure rate for high school students.4 7
The Kansas experience evidences some courts' willingness to treat
NCLB student achievement data asymmetrically in the adequacy liti-
gation setting. Although courts-such as the Kansas court-are will-
ing to conclude that a district's failure to achieve AYP evidences
inadequate education, courts appear reluctant to conclude that a dis-
trict's achievement of AYP evidences adequate education. Of course,
how any particular court chooses to interpret AYP determinations for
purposes of school finance adequacy is less important than the willing-
ness of both defendants and plaintiffs to use NCLB data. That both
parties to the school finance lawsuit turned to NCLB data underscores
the Act's robust role in the school finance litigation context.
B. Policy Consequences: Standards' Dilution & Federalism
Strain
Unanticipated consequences from the implementation of NCLB are
not limited to increased legal exposure for school districts and states.
NCLB also influences education policy in some states by contributing
to the dilution of student proficiency standards. This policy conse-
quence, if nothing else, is richly ironic. NCLB inadvertently contrib-
42. Id. at *47.
43. Id.
44. Id. at *49.
45. Id. at *41.
46. Id.
47. Id.
2007]
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utes to states' rolling back student proficiency thresholds in its well-
intentioned desire to improve student academic achievement and re-
duce achievement gaps among various student sub-groups. Moreover,
the unanticipated legal and policy consequences relate in a critical
way: the legal consequence partly explains the policy consequence.
Specifically, by reducing its student proficiency standards a state in-
creases the likelihood that it will achieve AYP under NCLB, thereby
decreasing (but not eliminating) its school finance litigation exposure.
1. Student Proficiency Standards: Reversing a Race-To-The-Top
Potentially increased exposure to school finance adequacy lawsuits
(as well as other adverse consequences to states and local school dis-
tricts flowing from NCLB), fueled partly by a school's inability to
achieve AYP, prompted some states to dilute their student proficiency
standards. 48 Such a result should surprise few. State lawmakers are
far more reluctant to establish bold student proficiency standards in
an effort to stimulate improvement now that litigants can transform
such standards into legal entitlements for additional education
resources.
During the early 1980s, motivated in part by the publication of the
Nation At Risk report,4 9 as well as by a healthy dose of political ambi-
tion, a set of young governors-principally from Southern states-
made education reform a priority.50 Prominent in their education re-
form pushes was a focus on developing and implementing challenging
student performance standards. Writing in 1986 for the Chairman's
Summary for the National Governor's Association report, Time For
Results,51 then-governor Lamar Alexander underscored the governors'
collective commitment to meaningful standards and assessments.52
Indeed, many governors boasted about their rigorous student perform-
ance standards and tethered them to efforts to make their states more
economically competitive. 53
48. See, e.g., Ryan, Perverse Incentives, supra note 10, at 946-48.
49. NAT'L COMMISSION ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERA-
TIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983).
50. These governors included: Lamar Alexander (Tennessee), Bill Clinton (Arkan-
sas), Bob Graham (Florida), Dick Riley (South Carolina), John Ashcroft (Mis-
souri), and Tom Kean (New Jersey). This gubernatorial coalition included, most
famously, a U.S. President (Clinton), two U.S. Secretaries of Education (Alexan-
der and Riley), and five U.S. Senators (Alexander, Ashcroft, Bill Clinton, Kearn,
Riley, and Graham).
51. NAT'L GOVERNORs' ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS,
TIME FOR RESULTS: THE GOVERNORS' 1991 REPORT ON EDUCATION (1986).
52. Id. at 4.
53. See, e.g., George Uhlig, Alabama Needs Systemic Change, New Educational Vi-
sion, MOBILE REGISTER (Dec. 5, 1993), at C3; Tony Freemantle, New Education
Chief Hailed as 'Visionary,' HOUSTON CHRON. (Dec. 22, 1992), at A6.
[Vol. 86:119
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Two critical changes have taken place since 1986. First, in 1989,
the education reform world was altered when the Kentucky Supreme
Court ushered school finance adequacy theory onto the legal stage. 54
Under adequacy theory, litigants abandoned the contention that all
students are entitled to the same resources in favor of the argument
that all students should receive the funds necessary to finance an ade-
quate education. In this context, adequacy is construed principally in
terms of student academic performance.55 Second, in 2001 Congress
passed,56 and in early 2002 President Bush signed, NCLB into law.57
These two changes altered the legal terrain and helped re-cast states'
policy efforts to implement rigorous student achievement standards in
a manner that enhanced legal liability for states and school districts.
The new legal terrain, the prospect of NCLB liability, the experi-
ence of districts failing to achieve AYP, and attendant parental, home-
owner, and voter expressions of concern understandably disquiet
many state policymakers and assuredly influence modifications to stu-
dent performance standards. Although it remains impossible to dis-
cern with absolute certainty what states would have done absent
NCLB and the emergence of school finance adequacy litigation, it is
clear that, at best, the new legal terrain generates a dilemma for
states. At worst, it creates a palpable incentive for states to dilute
their academic standards and proficiency thresholds. States with rig-
orous proficiency standards increase their potential to fail AYP
thresholds and trigger NCLB sanctions. Conversely, states with com-
paratively weak proficiency standards are better positioned to suc-
cessfully navigate NCLB requirements.
The adverse incentive influenced state student standards. Prior to
the emergence of school finance adequacy lawsuits and NCLB, many
states engaged in something resembling a race-to-the-top when it
came to developing and implementing rigorous student proficiency
standards. The emergence of adequacy litigation, accelerated by state
standards and assessments and NCLB consequences, had the effect of
reversing a race-to-the-top as states have responded by diluting stu-
dent proficiency standards.58
54. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). For a discussion see,
e.g., Ryan, Schools, supra note 32, at 268-69 (noting the shift in school finance
litigation theory from equity to adequacy in 1989).
55. For a general discussion of the movement from school finance equity to adequacy
theory and possible explanations for it, see Heise, State Constitutions, supra note
33.
56. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
57. See Superfine, supra note 25, at 787.
58. Ryan, Perverse Incentives, supra note 10, at 948 n.77 (noting that such states as
"Louisiana, Colorado, Connecticut, and Texas have all tinkered with their [stu-
dent] scoring systems in order to increase the number of students who will be
deemed proficient for purposes of the NCLBA."). See also David C. Hoff, States
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New York's experience, while perhaps more ambiguous as it re-
lates to the reaction to NCLB, vividly illustrates this trend and also
illustrates why states fear a potential financial sting flowing from
high student performance standards, how this potential can come into
fruition, and the potential magnitude of the stakes involved.
Prior to 1996, as almost all New York residents with school chil-
dren know well, the state awarded high school diplomas to graduates
and the more prestigious Regents Diploma to those students that
demonstrated the necessary level of academic achievement. Then in
1996, the New York State Board of Regents voted to require that stu-
dent achievement at the state's prestigious Regents Standards was
necessary for every student desiring a diploma from a New York public
high school.59 In 2003, however, the Board of Regents voted to delay
imposing the higher standard for two additional years. 60 New York
also retreated on other fronts by lowering the passing score threshold
and the required number of proficiency exams. 6 1 Indeed, it remains
unclear whether, how, or when New York will fully implement its Re-
gents Standards state-wide, as well as whether the Regents Diploma
will ever reflect the standards that existed prior to 1996.
The intersection of New York's Regents Standards and school fi-
nance litigation was hammered home to all New York taxpayers when
the state's highest court brought contentious school finance litigation
that persisted for more than a decade to a close. After protracted liti-
gation, New York's highest court imposed on state taxpayers, at a
minimum, an additional $1.93 billion for New York City's public
schools.6 2 A critical piece of the plaintiffs case-and the original trial
court decision-involved results from New York's Regents Standards
tests.
Prior to 1996, New York State's Regents Standards were among
the nation's most rigorous. The standards' rigor, however, guaranteed
a steady stream of students who failed to achieve the coveted New
York Regents Diploma. New York City successfully leveraged its stu-
dents' struggles on Regents tests as evidence of the state's failure to
provide an adequate education. 6 3 During the 1998-99 school year, for
example, the court noted that fourth and eighth-grade New York City
school children dramatically underperformed their counterparts
Revise the Meaning of 'Proficient', EDUC. WEEK, Oct. 9, 2002, at 1; Diana J.
Schemo, Sidestepping of New School Standards is Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15,
2002, at A21.
59. Karen W. Anderson, Scaling Back Changes On Regents Standards, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 14, 2003), at B5.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50 (N.Y. 2006).
63. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 518-19
(2001) (discussing results from state-wide tests).
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across the state.6 4 Although the court took great pains to note that it
was not prepared to equate New York's Regents Standards with the
threshold for adequacy,65 New York City's school finance lawsuit
pivoted partly on the assumption that adequate funding is the amount
necessary to ensure that New York City's students perform at a level
commensurate with their counterparts state-wide.
2. NAEP's Failed Assumption
Given the potential financial exposure to a school finance judg-
ment, it is quite clear in hindsight why lawmakers in New York (and
elsewhere) started diluting student performance standards. Such a
race to the bottom, however, was precisely what an under-appreciated
requirement under NCLB sought to deter. Perhaps understanding
the potential that states might react to NCLB by diluting state stu-
dent performance standards, NCLB also made mandatory what was
once voluntary: state participation in National Assessment of Educa-
tional Progress (NAEP) testing.66 NCLB requires states to submit a
sample of their fourth and eighth graders to NAEP reading and math
tests every other year.67 Until NCLB, state participation in NAEP
testing, the nation's only true metric that facilitates comparisons of
student achievement across states (and across nations) was voluntary.
Some states, anxious to see how their students fared in comparison to
their counterparts in other states, willingly participated in NAEP
testing prior to NCLB's enactment. Other states did not. Although
NAEP test results do not trigger any NCLB sanctions, by mandating
state participation in NAEP testing, NCLB ensures one common na-
tional assessment of student performance.
The need for a common national assessment of student achieve-
ment is important because NCLB affords states tremendous latitude
in setting their own student performance standards. Variation in
state standards frustrates comparisons of student performance across
states. Mandating state participation in NAEP was designed, in part,
to establish one external check on student achievement. NCLB pro-
ponents assumed that the threat of embarrassment flowing from a
state reporting that its students performed exceptionally well on state
tests but poorly on NAEP would blunt a state's desire to dramatically
lower its student performance standards. 68
64. Id.
65. Id. at 484-84 (noting the court would use Regents test data with "prudence").
66. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 § 1111(c)(2), 20 U.S.C. § 6311(c)(2) (Supp. IV
2004).
67. Id.
68. Compare Lynn Olsen, Want To Confirm State Test Scores? It's Complex, But
NAEP Can Do It, EDUC. WEEK, Mar. 13, 2002, at Al (arguing that states will
respond to NAEP pressure), with Diane Ravitch, Every State Left Behind, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2005, at A23 (arguing that national testing is necessary).
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If NCLB proponents assumed that the specter of public embarrass-
ment from unflattering comparisons of state and NAEP assessments
would blunt a state's impulse to dilute its state student achievement
standards, they were wrong.6 9 If the legal and related financial expo-
sure from school finance litigation did not provide enough incentive to
dilute standards, the political pressures incident to failing to achieve
AYP under NCLB supplied additional incentive. 7 0 Finally, the prefer-
ences of historically strong performing suburban districts,71 as well as
a distaste for the increased emphasis on standardized student
achievement testing,7 2 provided even more political pressure to dilute
student achievement standards, notwithstanding NAEP.
Increased legal and financial liability, public embarrassment from
comparisons between state and NAEP student achievement data, po-
litical discomfort generated by the annual requirement of meeting
AYP, and increased attention to standardized testing generate a di-
lemma for many states: the maintenance of high student proficiency
standards now comes with a price-and the price can be steep. As it
relates to the potential financial price (triggered by NCLB or legal lia-
bility from a successful school finance adequacy lawsuit), in a world of
ever-increasing claimants on state resources, the policy path of least
resistance becomes even more attractive to many lawmakers. Increas-
ingly, this policy path is for states to relax student performance stan-
dards. Early evidence, while far from definitive, suggests that many
states are responding in exactly this manner.
IV. NEBRASKA, FEDERALISM, AND NO STATE LEFT BEHIND
At one level, NCLB illustrates the law of unintended consequences.
NCLB provides an accelerant to school finance litigation and incents
states to dilute student performance standards. At a more abstract
and theoretical level, however, NCLB provides an important lesson on
federalism. As Nebraska's experience illustrates, NCLB's structure
conveys uncertainty about or discomfort with the proper allocation of
policymaking authority among the federal, state, and local actors in
the education context.73
69. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
70. Ryan, Perverse Incentives, supra note 10, at 944-52.
71. Paul T. O'Neill, High Stakes Testing Law and Litigation, 2003 BRIGHAM YOUNG
UNIV. EDUC. & L. J. 623, 657-660 (2003) (discussing suburban backlashes against
standardized testing).
72. See generally Richard Rothstein, Lessons: A Rebellion Is Growing Against Re-
quired Tests, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2001, at B9.
73. For a more general discussion see Heise, Federalism, supra note 14.
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A. Standards, Assessments, and Conflict Over Control
Federal lawmakers "blinked" in terms of their willingness to push
the federalism boundary by assigning to the federal government au-
thority to impose sanctions for failing to achieve AYP, while giving the
states the authority to develop their own student assessment systems
and define student proficiency. Of course, NCLB requires that state
assessment systems must be "rigorous" 74 and receive U.S. Depart-
ment of Education approval.75 Nevertheless, while NCLB seeks to
hold states accountable for unacceptable student academic progress,
NCLB largely permits states to define for themselves what constitutes
acceptable and unacceptable student performance. Whether NCLB's
structure reflects uncertainty about the reach of Article I authority or
represents a necessary political compromise is unclear.76 What is
clear, however, is that NCLB generated criticism by endeavoring to
split the federalism atom. 77
Nebraska's experience with student assessment systems, required
for those states participating in NCLB, illustrates some of the inevita-
ble problems that flow from efforts to straddle the "federalism fence."
Prompted by state legislation passed during the 2000 session7 8 and
subsequently informed by the passage of NCLB, Nebraska policymak-
ers undertook the development of its STARS79 accountability system.
Unlike most states that implemented state-wide assessment instru-
ments, Nebraska's more than 500 school districts developed local as-
sessment instruments consistent with state standards. Nebraskans
pursued a decentralized approach to avoid pressuring local school dis-
tricts or inducing undue curriculum narrowing.8 0 Nebraska's ap-
proach, however, was not without risk as its protracted struggle with
the U.S. Department of Education regarding assessment approval
illustrates.
Nebraska's most recent tussle with the federal government began
on June 30, 2006, when the U.S. Department of Education notified the
Nebraska Commissioner of Education that Nebraska's STARS assess-
74. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 § 1111 (b)(1)(D)(i)(II), 20 U.S.C.
§ 6311(b)(1)(D)(i)(II) (Supp. IV 2004).
75. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(e)(1).
76. As to the reach of Article I authority in this context I have previously argued that
Congress' conditional spending authority would enable it to regulate student
achievement proficiency levels. See Heise, Federalism, supra note 14.
77. Ryan, Perverse Incentives, supra note 10, at 987.
78. L.B. 812, 96th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Neb. 2002).
79. STARS stands for "School-based, Teacher-led Assessment and Reporting
System."
80. Pat Roschewski et al., Nebraskans Reach for the STARS, 82 PHI DELTA KAPPAN
611, 613 (2001).
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ment system failed to meet NCLB's accountability requirements.S1
Needless to say, the U.S. Department of Education's finding did not sit
well with Nebraskans in general and the state's chief education of-
ficer, Doug Christensen, in particular. In a letter to Nebraskans,
Christensen expressed his dismay and noted, among other points of
objection, his distinct dissatisfaction that the federal government,
which contributes "less than 9% of the funding [for education in Ne-
braska]," nonetheless manages to "leverage[ ] 100% of the
accountability."8 2
Although the U.S. Department of Education's hesitation over
STARS did not specifically reference the gap between the percentage
of Nebraska students the state reported as "proficient" and the per-
centage of Nebraska students that achieved proficiency on NAEP tests
(Figures 1 and 2), given the growing public attention to such gaps, it is
hard to imagine federal officials were unaware of them.8 3 Regardless
of the federal government's motivation for denying certification to Ne-
braska's STARS program, access to 25% of the Nebraska Department
of Education's federal Title I administrative fund allocation for fiscal
year 2006 (totaling $126,741) was at immediate risk.
The immediate financial threat to Nebraskans was blunted, how-
ever, when the U.S. Department of Education softened its original po-
sition incident to a formal appeal by Christensen.8 4 On September 15,
2006, after a review of Nebraska's appeal, the Department
redesignated Nebraska's standards and assessment system as "Ap-
proval Pending."8 5 While the redesignation means that Nebraska's
STARS assessment system remains noncompliant with NCLB re-
quirements, based on assurances from the Nebraska Department of
Education, the U.S. Department of Education now expects that cer-
tain conditions (including a requirement to complete a peer-review
process) will be satisfactorily completed by the end of the 2006-07
school year. The federal government's "Approval Pending" classifica-
81. Letter from Henry L. Johnson, U.S. Asst. Secretary of Educ., to Douglas Chris-
tensen, Neb. Comm'r of Educ. (June 30, 2006). Assistant Secretary Johnson spe-
cifically cites to NCLB Sec. 111(b)(1) and (3), available at http://www.nde.state.
ne.us/1STARSNCLB/Johnson2CommO63006.pdf.
82. Letter from Doug Christensen, Neb. Comm'r of Educ., to "All Nebraskans" (July
5, 2006), available at http://www.nde.state.ne.us/lSTARSNCLB/STARSand
USDE.htm.
83. See, e.g., Paul E. Peterson & Frederick M. Hess, Keeping an Eye on State Stan-
dards: A Race to the Bottom?, EDUc. NEXT, Summer 2006, at 28-29.
84. Letter from Douglas Christensen, Neb. Comm'r of Educ. to Henry L. Johnson,
U.S. Asst. Secretary of Educ. (July 28, 2006), available at http://www.nde.state.
ne.us/1STARSNCLB/STARSandUSDE.htm.
85. Letter from Henry L. Johnson, U.S. Asst. Secretary of Educ., to Douglas Chris-
tensen, Neb. Comm'r of Educ. (Sept. 15, 2006), available at http://www.nde.state.
ne.us/documents/06_ESEA_NCLB.pdf.
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tion also means that Nebraska can receive its full share of Title I edu-
cation funds.8 6
Christensen's lingering complaint about the federal government
seeking to exert significant policy leverage in exchange for the federal
government's comparatively small contribution to education funding
raises a critical federalism issue. As a matter of formal constitutional
law, almost all agree that NCLB is a constitutionally permissible exer-
cise of the federal government's conditional spending authority. Yet
from a policy perspective, should the federal government be permitted
to "constitutionally coerce" states in a manner that exceeds the federal
financial contribution? Why is Nebraska's submission to NAEP test-
ing not an adequate federal check? Although I have discussed the fed-
eralism point from a more theoretical perspective previously,8 7 the
Nebraska experience permits the application of actual facts to legal
theory.
B. Student Academic Achievement: Nebraska, NAEP, and
the Nation
Independent of the dispute over whether Nebraska's STARS as-
sessment program comports with NCLB requirements, Nebraska,
along with every other state, is now required to submit to the NAEP
testing program.8 8 Indeed, mandatory NAEP participation was de-
sired, in part, to help mitigate the risk that states would establish low
student performance thresholds to better ensure meeting AYP re-
quirements. Only by comparing a state's assessment of its student
proficiency with the state's performance on the NAEP test can one
place a state's annual AYP reports into meaningful context. Data
from the NAEP tests are among the precious few measures that facili-
tate comparisons of student performance across states. Thus, Ne-
braska's NAEP participation addresses at least one federal interest-
the dissemination of an additional measure of student academic pro-
gress that comes from a source other than Nebraska.
While NCLB's desire to generate and disseminate helpful informa-
tion may be served through NAEP-and regardless of what student
assessment system Nebraskans use-other critical NCLB goals can be
thwarted by states that fail to implement "rigorous" student perform-
ance assessments as required under NCLB.89 While NAEP participa-
tion should reveal any state with weak student academic proficiency
standards, NCLB does not require that states do anything about even
jarring gaps between a state's definition of student proficiency and
86. Id.
87. See Heise, Federalism, supra note 14.
88. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 § 1111(c)(2), 20 U.S.C. § 6311(c)(2) (Supp. IV
2004).
89. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1)(D)(i)(II).
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NAEP's definition. Thus, for annual AYP determinations to have any
meaning and for NCLB to operate coherently, states must have in
place a serious student assessment system with legitimate student
performance thresholds.
By avoiding certified state assessments (at least as of now and ac-
cording to the U.S. Department of Education), Nebraska may unduly
insulate itself from the sliding scale of NCLB sanctions and, if so,
thwart a critical legislative goal. To be sure, under NCLB the new
"price" of access to federal education dollars is the development of stu-
dent performance standards that the Department deems "rigorous."
At this point, aside from declining federal education funds (which, of
course, remains a legal option for Nebraskans), the only viable issue is
whether the new price for federal Title I funds (for Nebraska, the re-
maining cost involves bringing its STARS program into full compli-
ance with NCLB requirements) is politically acceptable. From a
constitutional perspective, it is well understood that the Department
can enforce such a price.
Although all Nebraska school districts were charged with develop-
ing their own local assessment standards consistent with state thresh-
olds, variation across school districts was almost inevitable. Such
variation increases the probability that standards in some local dis-
tricts are more rigorous than others. Although NCLB exposed itself to
some level of risk by permitting states to devise their own assessment
mechanism and, more importantly, establish their own proficiency
standards, this risk increases dramatically when these critical stan-
dards-setting tasks are delegated to individual school districts, as is
the case in Nebraska.
By maintaining a decentralized system of standards-setting while
NCLB increased centralization, Nebraskans assuredly understood
they were adopting a contrarian posture. Nevertheless, by participat-
ing in the NAEP testing program, Nebraska addressed at least one of
the Act's goals: creating and disseminating useful student achieve-
ment data. Perhaps NAEP data might provide information germane
to Nebraska's federalism position.
To the extent that a comparison of NAEP and Nebraska's STAR
results supplies information, the information thus far has not been
positive. As Figures 1 and 2 illustrate, a consistent and sizable gap
separates what Nebraska's STARS assessment defines as proficient
and what NAEP deems proficient. To take results from the most re-
cent school year for which there are data (2004-05), while more than
84 percent of Nebraska fourth graders met or exceeded state reading
standards, only 33 percent of these same fourth graders performed at
the "proficient" or above level on the NAEP reading test. A similar
gap emerged in math. While more than 87 percent of students met or
exceeded Nebraska state standards, only 36 percent performed
[Vol. 86:119
NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND
"proficiently" on the NAEP test. Moreover, if there is a trend over
time, it suggests a widening gap between those students satisfying
Nebraska reading and math standards and achieving "proficiency" on
the NAEP tests.
Figures 1 & 2: Nebraska STARS Results v.
Nebraska NAEP Results:
4th Grade Reading & Math
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SOURCE: U.S. Dept. of Education, various years; Nebraska Dept. of Education, various
years.
To be sure, the existence of a gap between a state's standards and
NAEP performance, by itself, does not establish much. However, a
significant gap that persists over time at the very least raises ques-
tions that warrant serious consideration and study. It may be that
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NAEP tests are a flawed measure of student academic performance.
Notwithstanding any flaws, however, NAEP data are almost unique
in that they facilitate direct comparisons among students across
states. It is also possible that Nebraska's STARS assessments provide
a more accurate and meaningful measure of student academic per-
formance. Even if reasons exist to prefer Nebraska's STARS over
NAEP data, it remains exceptionally difficult to test the reasons with-
out the benefit of an external (that is, non-Nebraskan) reference. To
the extent that the nation's only external data-NAEP data-suggest
that Nebraska may have set its performance thresholds too low, per-
haps the evidentiary burden is properly placed on Nebraska to estab-
lish that its STARS assessment program remains probative,
notwithstanding discrepancies with NAEP data. The NAEP data cast
important light on the U.S. Department of Education's hesitation over
Nebraska's STARS system.90
Nebraska's Commissioner of Education, Doug Christensen, made
his views clear on the efficacy of the NAEP results. In an editorial
discussing various state and national assessments, Christensen dis-
counted NAEP's probative value as a measurement of Nebraskan stu-
dent achievement. 9 1 While acknowledging that NAEP results "tell us
something," he argued that the test scores' "accuracy and validity...
diminish as the distance between the classroom and the assessment
increases."9 2
While Christensen's view of NAEP data is understandable, it bears
noting that other perspectives on NAEP's usefulness exist. NAEP re-
sults are widely acknowledged as providing the evidentiary founda-
tion for the "Nation's Report Card."93 In addition to measuring
national student academic achievement, NAEP has been administered
biennially since 1990 to representative samples of public school stu-
dents in individual states. Consequently, limitations notwithstand-
ing, NAEP results are the only psychometrically valid basis for
interstate student achievement comparisons.94
90. On the other hand, Nebraska is far from alone in promoting a state assessment
system that generates positive results that far exceed the results suggested by
NAEP data. See Peterson & Hess, Keeping an Eye, supra note 83.
91. Memorandum from Doug Christensen, Neb. Comm'r of Educ., State Assessments,
National Tests: How They Are Different, What They Tell Us, unpublished memo-
randum (Dec. 15, 2006), available at http://www.nde.state.ne.usCOMMISHI
121506_editorial.pdf.
92. Id.
93. See Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, The Nation's Report Card, NAEP Overview,
http'/nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/about/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).
94. Goodwin Liu, Interstate Inequality in Educational Opportunity, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
2044, 2074 (2006) (describing NAEP tests).
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C. Checkbook Federalism
Assuming that Nebraska's assessment system eventually comes
into compliance with NCLB requirements, the possibility of a gap be-
tween Nebraska's assessment mechanism and NAEP assessments
persists (this is true of virtually every other state as well). Should the
possibility come to fruition, consequences from it are better dealt with
as a matter of policy than law.
Although conventional wisdom in federalism debates-at least in
academic circles-points to Nebraska's experience with NCLB as evi-
dence of problems with federalism that require fixing, alternative per-
spectives exist. Indeed, one may view the Nebraska experience as
identifying a potential federalism boundary from a policy (rather than
Constitutional) perspective. Giving shape and texture to this possible
boundary is the degree to which we want to tether education policy
authority and funding responsibility.
Federalism promotes important benefits that cut deeply in the edu-
cation setting, including diversity and the ability of states to experi-
ment with policies. Federalism also fuels subsidiarity, or the principle
that public decisions are best made at the lowest governmental unit of
analysis. Finally, federalism helps ensure that the unit of government
saddled with financial responsibility enjoys policy authority. One crit-
ical cost of federalism, however, is that, in certain contexts-such as
education in general and student performance standards setting in
particular-it can fuel a race-to-the-bottom.
NCLB endeavors to maximize federalism's benefits while minimiz-
ing its costs. Under NCLB, each governmental actor-individual
states and the federal government-more or less gets what it pays for.
The federal government makes federal education dollars for states
conditional on participation in NCLB and submitting to its policy
overhang. States, however, remain free to define for themselves profi-
ciency levels. While Nebraska may yet have to tinker with its assess-
ment instruments to fully conform with NCLB requirements, once it
does so, it will then have paid "in full" the current price of access to
federal education funding. The costs associated with NCLB participa-
tion increase, however, in the event that Nebraska school districts fail
to achieve AYP. Whether the benefits exceed the costs overall or in
any particular state, such as Nebraska, endures as an important ques-
tion. If nothing else, NCLB generates the derivative benefit of making
the relevant costs and benefits more transparent than they were prior
to 2001.
Even if a gap between what Nebraskans deem proficient and what
NAEP suggests persists, Nebraska is not obligated to close that gap.
So long as the tradeoffs are transparent, open, and notorious, Nebras-
kans remain free to resist national perspectives on student profi-
ciency. That is, once informed about the gaps between what their
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state deems as proficient and what NAEP deems as proficient,
Nebraskans will have received the information required under NCLB.
From a normative perspective, whether something ought to be done
about persistent, significant gaps between what Nebraska's STARS
results deem as proficient student achievement and what NAEP re-
sults might suggest raises an interesting question perhaps best left to
-state -policymakers and voters.
Making this question even more difficult is that under our present
understanding of Congress's conditional spending authority, it is rea-
sonably clear that Congress possesses the necessary Constitutional
authority to expand NCLB in a way that could force states to adopt
NAEP as its assessment mechanism. To do so under NCLB as pres-
ently structured, however, raises troubling policy issues and threatens
to erode some of federalism's benefits. NCLB's policy influence over
the nation's public elementary and secondary schools far exceeds the
federal government's financial contribution. While NCLB does not
constitute impermissible constitutional coercion, even NCLB's harsh-
est critics must concede it illustrates the high art of policy coercion.
To strain the nexus between policy influence and financial contribu-
tion beyond the degree NCLB already strains it would threaten to un-
dermine our federalism structure, at least as it relates to education
policy.
Again, this is not to say that Congress lacks the authority to push
NCLB even further and, for example, impose upon states NAEP as the
national barometer of student performance. In so doing, Congress
would be assigning to the federal government enforcement authority
as well as standards setting authority. Perhaps this is the only effica-
cious solution to guard against states' standards dilution efforts. Such
a move by Congress, however, would enhance NCLB's already signifi-
cant influence over state education policy. To enhance federal influ-
ence over state and local education policy without a corresponding
increase- in the federal government's financial contribution to the na-
tion's elementary and secondary schools risks straining the nexus be-
tween policy control and financial responsibility beyond its breaking
point. Such a consequence risks ceding important federalism benefits.
V. CONCLUSION
For better or worse (or, perhaps more accurately, for better and
worse), NCLB's influence over America's public elementary and secon-
dary schools is both enormous and increasing. Setting aside debates
about the efficacy of NCLB as education policy, few dispute the pro-
position that it has generated consequences, both intended and unin-
tended. Among an array of unintended consequences, two stand clear:
NCLB's contribution to school finance adequacy litigation as well as
the related-though distinct-result of prompting some states to di-
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lute their student proficiency standards. One of NCLB's legacies is its
contribution to a heritage of unexpected consequences in a familiar
context-education. These particular unexpected consequences also
call attention to critical federalism questions that NCLB raises.
These federalism questions arise owing to NCLB's bold effort to
restructure policymaking authority in American education. To the ex-
tent that NCLB succeeds in its effort to reallocate education poli-
cymaking authority among the federal, state, and local governments,
NCLB's most significant legacy may have little to do with lawsuits
and student performance standards.
